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FREE SPEECH
U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech ....
N.Y. CONST. art. , § 8:
Every citizen may freely speak . . his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no lMv
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Rogers v. New York City Transit Authority'
(decided May 1, 1997)
Petitioner brought an Article 78 proceeding2 before the New
York Court of Appeals seeking review of the Appellate
Division's reversal of a supreme court's judgment in his favor.'
Taken as of right on constitutional grounds, petitioner sought to
annul the New York City Transit Authority's [hereinafter
"NYCTA"] determination that he violated New York Code Rules
and Regulations [hereinafter "NYCRR"] section 1050.6(b)4 in
189 N.Y.2d 692, 680 N.E.2d 142, 657 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1997).
2 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1994). An Article 78 proceeding is
authorized pursuant to the following provision: "Relief previously obtained by
writs of certiorari to review, mandamus or prohibition shall be obtained in a
proceeding under this article." Id.
3Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 696, 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
4 N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. AND REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b). Section 1050.6
refers to "use of the transit system" and in subsection (b) states in pertinent
part:
No person, unless duly authorized by the authority shall
engage in any commercial activity upon any facility or
conveyances. Commercial activities include: (1) the
advertising, display, sale lease, offer for sale or lease, or
distribution of food, goods, services or entertainment
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that he conducted "unauthorized commercial activity" by selling
political materials on a subway platform.' The New York Court
of Appeals found that the petitioner's argument was unpersuasive
and held that such action on the part of the NYCTA did not
amount to an infringement of the right to free speech as
guaranteed under both the Federal6 and New York State7
Constitutions.! Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the
Appellate Division and held that the NYCTA's regulatory and
adjudicative actions were within constitutional bounds.'
On October 30, 1993, a few days before New York City
elections were to take place, petitioner and other volunteers from
a political group known as the Socialist Workers Party, set up a
card table on the mezzanine level of the Jamaica, Queens subway
station.' o They placed upon this table various pamphlets and
literature about their organization." While some of the literature
was given away for free, other materials including the group's
weekly newspaper, The Militant, were offered for sale. 12 After a
warning by a NYCTA officer that such action constituted
unlawful sales activity, and a subsequent relocation outside the
station, petitioner returned to the station and again erected the
card table, replete with copies of the for sale Militant."
Petitioner was then issued a ticket stating that he was in violation
of the rule against the selling of such materials of this kind in the
(including the free distribution of promotional goods or
materials) ....
Id.
'Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 697, 680 N.E.2d at 145, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." Id.7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section provides: "Every citizen may freely
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
'Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 697, 680 N.E.2d at 145, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
9Id.
'
0id. at 696, 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
" Id. at 697, 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
'
21d. at 696-97, 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
"3 Id. at 696, 680 N.E.2d at 145, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
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subway.14 Petitioner brought suit against the NYCTA after
NYCTA Appeals Board sustained the judgment imposing a fifty
dollar fine against the petitioner.15  The suit alleged that the
hearing given by the NYCTA was unfair, that the petitioner's
actions were permissible under Article 21, Section 1050.6(c) of
the NYCRR,16 and that the NYCTA's actions were violative of
his constitutional right to free speech. 17 The supreme court ruled
for the petitioner.' 8 The Appellate Division, First Department,
reversed and the Court of Appeals affirmed that determination. 9
The court's opinion opened with the statement that the
Constitution does not provide absolute protections of "all forms
of speech at all times on all kinds of property. . ."" without
regard to "the nature of the activity, the property or the
disruption that might be engendered by unregulated expressive
activity .... 21 Further, the Court of Appeals stated that the
government, as owner of property can "preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."'
In reviewing these powers, the Rogers court adopted the "forum
based" analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in
numerous cases including Cornelius v. NAACP' and
14 id.
15Id. at 696, 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.16 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. AND REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(c). This section lists
exceptions to non transit activities that would otherwise be prohibited under
subsection (b) provided that such uses do not interfere with the transit system's
operation and provided that they are "conducted in accordance with the rules
governing the conduct and safety of the public in the use of the facilities of the
NYCTA." Id.
17 Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d 697, 680 N.E.2d at 145, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
"I1d., 680 N.E.2d at 144, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
19 Id.
2-Id. at 698, 680 N.E.2d at'145, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
21 id.
22id.
23473 U.S. 788 (1985). In Cornelius, The NAACP brought an action against
the director of the office of Personnel Management, which had a policy that
prohibited legal groups from participating in a charity fund drive project
entitled Combined Federal Campaign [hereinafter CFC], that targeted federal
employees. Id. at 788. The NAACP argued that solicitation, as a form of
speech, was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment and that the
1998 1043
3
et al.: Free Speech
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
TOURO LAW REVIEW
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee24 where
regulations were assessed as being either content-based or
viewpoint neutral.Y
In finding that petitioner's right to free speech was not violated,
the Court of Appeals first distinguished the case at bar from those
cases that involved content-based regulations. 26  Applying the
public forum doctrine27 and citing to the United States Supreme
Court case of Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educator's Association,28  the Rogers court wrote that
policy instituted by the Office of Personnel was in violation of that right. Id.
at 793. The Court held that the First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-
neutral exclusion when that exclusions purpose was to stop any disruptive
solicitation of federal employees at their work place. Id. Further, because the
regulation applied to a non-public forum, reasonable regulation to ensure
effectiveness in the CFC was allowable if reasonable and non capricious. Id.
at 813.
24 505 U.S. 672 (1992). In International Society, a religious organization
sued the New York Port Authority's prohibition of solicitation on its
properties. Id. at 675. The Krishna's, as they are commonly known, had
developed a technique to raise funds for their group by approaching travelers
passing through the terminals of airports and asking for donations to their
cause. Id. The Krishna's argued that such solicitation was protected as free
speech under the First Amendment and that airport terminals were to be
considered public forums and as such could not be subjected to restrictions on
speech. Id. The Court held that airport terminals were not public forums and
were not disallowed from imposing reasonable regulations designed to control
the pedestrian traffic of a busy area, but nonetheless held the statute void
because it was arbitrary in its prohibiting leafleting but not other methods of
solicitation that would create just as much of a traffic burden. Id. at 692.
5 Id.
26Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 698, 680 N.E.2d at 145, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
27 Id. This doctrine stands for the proposition that places that have
traditionally been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens and discussing public questions, and have by policy or by
practice [been used] for indiscriminate use by the general public demand the
application of the strictest judicial review when considering regulations that
inhibit the exercise of free speech on that property. See Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460
U.S. 37 (1982).
28 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry, a collective bargaining agreement between
a town's Board of Education and a teacher's association gave that association
the exclusive right to use an inter-school mail system. Id. at 39. Another
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"regulations of time, place, and manner of expression may be
permissible only when they are content neutral and narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest .... "9
Further, the Court of Appeals held that the government is allowed
to reserve property under its control for a specific use and can
restrict the activities that take place on that property, including
limiting it as a forum for free speech, so long as the regulation
against such activity "is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression because of disagreement with the speaker's view."3"
The court found the United States Supreme Court case of
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee3 to be
"particularly cogent and instructive" in its application of the
public forum analysis with regard to property operated by a
public authority. 3 The court stated that a public forum analysis
would have to take into consideration the ability of such facilities
to accommodate expressive activity.3 Furthermore, the court
noted that the NYCTA's primary function in owning property
such as the subway platform was "unquestionably to facilitate the
safe and efficient transport of passengers in a responsible
manner."' Thus, the Rogers court held, the NYCTA had a
compelling interest in providing an efficient and safe environment
for the riders who use the subway and may employ reasonable
regulations that accomplish that goal.35
Petitioner's state constitutional argument was also rejected by
the Rogers court and the case upon which he based that argument
teacher's union which was not granted the right to use the system challenged
the agreement as limiting their right to free speech as guaranteed by the First
Amendment. Id. The Court held that plaintiff's exclusion did not amount to a
constitutional deprivation of First Amendment rights because the inter-school
mail system was not considered to be a public forum for communication. Id.
at 55.
29Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 698, 680 N.E.2d at 145, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.30Id. at 698-99, 680 N.E.2d at 146, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 875.31505 U.S. 672 (1992).
32 Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 700, 680 N.E.2d at 147, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
33/d.
3Id. at 700-01, 680 N.E.2d at 147, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
35 Id.
1998 1045
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was interpreted by the court to support his adversary's position.36
Petitioner relied on SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall" for the
argument that the State cannot exclude persons from public
property for exercising their First Amendment rights. 8 The court
held that since this case was overruled, it could be used as
supplementary support for its judgment.39 Stating that SHAD
Alliance stands for the proposition that Article One, Section Eight
of the New York State Constitution "does not provide the
claimed separate right of access to privately owned places," the
Rogers court, through analogy and extension to the quasi-public
subway platform, found petitioner's rationale "not
supportable. "40
Lastly, the Rogers court rejected the petitioner's argument that
his actions were covered by 1050.6(c) 41 which allowed "non
transit expressive activity" and included some forms of
expression (like artistic performances and religious proselytizing)
that asked passerby's for donations.4 It found a distinction
between the permissible activity of these performances as
described in the statute and the impermissible commercial activity
in which the petitioner was involved.43 Finding the regulatory
scheme as viewpoint-neutral and reasonable, the Court of Appeals
held that the NYCTA was justified in its circumscribing
"purveyors" because not disallowing them would result in a
domination of vendors over those to which Subsection (c) was
designed to apply; "Any other more generous view might lead to
a veritable bazaar of expressive merchandise being authorized to
36id.
17 106 A.D.2d 189, 484 N.Y.S. 849 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488
N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985).
38 Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 702, 680 N.E.2d at 148, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 877
(citing People v. Leonard, 62 N.Y.2d 404, 465 N.E.2d 831, 477 N.Y.S.2d
111 (1984)).
39 Id.
40 id.
41 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. AND REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(c).
42 Rogers, 89 N.Y.2d at 704, 680 N.E.2d at 149, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
43 Id. at 704, 680 N.E.2d at 148, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
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be churned for sale throughout the subway system." 44 The court
rejected defendant's argument calling for a more expansive
reading of what constituted expressive activity by reasoning that
the rationale of the regulation was sound and that it was necessary
to maintain a safe, controllable subway platform.45
In concluding that the NYCTA's regulation and its application
to plaintiff were within federal constitutional perimeters, the
Rogers court first found that subway stations were not public
forums and that the NYCTA could impose regulations that
restricted the use of properties under its control.46 The Rogers
court further noted that even applying the federal standard of
strict judicial scrutiny to the NYCTA's subway platforms upon a
finding that such places were limited public forums (or even full
fledged public forums) the regulations would still stand because
the NYCTA evinced a compelling interest in providing "the
service and securing [the] protection of the entire riding
public." 47 The Rogers court interpreted the New York State
Constitution as exacting a similar standard to that imposed by the
Federal Constitution and held that regulations of speech in public
forums must satisfy the "sharpest scrutiny." 48 Further, the court
stated that when a governmental entity has opened up a space for
limited public expression and debate, that entity may still regulate
activities that take place on that space so long as the restrictions
are reasonable in light of that area's intended purpose and the
regulations are not in response to the owner's disagreement with
the speaker's viewpoint.49 In its essential terms, the Rogers court
adopted the standard employed by courts in the federal system. 50
44Id.
45id.
4Id. at 705, 680 N.E.2d at 149, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
47 id.
48 Id. at 698, 680 N.E.2d at 146, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 874.49 Id. at 705, 680 N.E.2d at 150, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
1 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992) (holding that airport terminals were not public forums and could impose
reasonable regulations designed to control pedestrian traffic).
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